OPINION – Türkiye’s active diplomacy and rising mediation profile

 Türkiye has moved from a mere bystander middle power to one that is a bridge-building and stabilizing force aiming for sustainable peace and prosperity

The author is the publication coordinator and a columnist for Daily Sabah, an English-language daily in Türkiye.

ISTANBUL

In attempts to find solutions to conflicts between nations or disagreements among different parties within a nation, mediation by international actors has become a key method to resolving political disputes. Mediation is conducted by the intervention of third-party actors — be they states or non-state actors — that have the warring parties’ trust to facilitate a platform for negotiations and dialogue between the parties.

Türkiye’s strong role as a mediator

In recent years, Türkiye’s active efforts in diplomacy have come to the fore in global politics across several regions, as Ankara has been highlighted as an influential actor achieving tangible results in its mediation efforts. Specifically, the belief held by Türkiye’s foreign policy decision-makers in establishing sustained peace and stability through mediation has led Turkish diplomats to intervene in conflicts in its immediate neighborhood, as seen in the Russia-Ukraine war, and beyond, such as in its intervention in the dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia. It is important to note that Türkiye’s mediation efforts are not limited to these examples. In the Balkans, it has been a significant contributor to peacebuilding through trilateral cooperation between the Serb, Croat, and Bosnian communities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Turkish diplomats also played a key role in the peace process between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and in building trust between Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2007. They have always been involved in finding a solution to the Palestinian struggle and exercise diplomacy to solve the problems of the Arakan Muslims in Myanmar, and have even been involved in US-Iran nuclear talks.

Most recently, Türkiye facilitated the second round of talks in the Ankara Process on recent disputes between Ethiopia and Somalia, related to Addis Ababa’s recent deal with Somaliland. The talks took place in the Turkish capital, with the third round scheduled to for mid-September. Prior to that, Turkish authorities facilitated and provided logistical support for a prisoner exchange, again in the Turkish capital, involving seven countries in what has been called the most extensive swap operation since the Cold War. Another recent example showing Ankara’s rising mediation profile is US envoy to Ankara Jeff Flake’s call to Turkish officials to persuade Tehran to de-escalate tensions in the Middle East after the killing of senior Hamas figure Ismail Haniyeh. Moreover, as an actor with working pragmatic ties with both Kyiv and Moscow, Ankara’s diplomatic muscle has been at work since the beginning of the conflict. So far, it has facilitated negotiations, the exchange of prisoners, and the internationally lauded deal for grain exports, minimizing the risk of an international food crisis.

Türkiye’s rising prestige in international arena

The abovementioned examples of Turkish diplomacy’s mediation efforts reflect a few new realities about Türkiye as an influential actor. The political stability of the past two decades, coupled with economic growth, diversification in energy resources, and the drastic growth in its defense industry has created a new and prestigious image of Türkiye’s diplomatic strength. In addition, Ankara’s active engagement beyond its immediate neighborhood, particularly through development cooperation, has elevated Türkiye’s perceived prestige. Built upon this, Türkiye has been able to move its relations in regions like Africa beyond development cooperation to new realms like defense, trade, and energy cooperation, which have ultimately contributed to its image as a “trustworthy” partner. As such, Türkiye has been able to engage with warring parties in different regions due to its principled yet pragmatic foreign policy. It is reasonable that Türkiye, like other states, puts its interests first. Yet, it does not base its actions on exploitative nature. Instead, a win-win approach to relations has raised Türkiye’s prestige internationally to the point that it is able to conduct niche diplomacy.

Moreover, while Türkiye’s status as a middle power has grown in material terms and in terms of diplomatic behavior and a colonialism-free past, its geographic proximity and geopolitical location have further strengthened its mediation capabilities. Compared to the other traditional mediators of the Global North such as the US, Canada, and Switzerland, Türkiye has been able to present itself as a more effective middle-power actor from the Global South, aiming to find solutions to the problems of the Global South as a partner from the same geopolitical sphere.

In conclusion, Türkiye has been categorized as a middle power in contemporary history, yet it was not until very recently that it was able to conduct and practice the behaviors of a middle-power country, including niche diplomacy. The changes in Türkiye’s political, economic, and military power since the early 2000s under the leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan have elevated its international status and Ankara is now able to intervene in regional conflicts. The country has moved from being a mere bystander middle power to one that is a bridge-building and stabilizing force aiming for sustainable peace and prosperity, not only in its immediate region, but in far-away places as well. This is exemplified in its recent engagement in the Horn of Africa. It should be noted that Türkiye’s role as an active mediator is particularly in line with and a reflection of dynamism in foreign policy decision-making in Ankara. Lastly, it should be kept in mind that all conflicts have their own dynamics and finding a solution to some may take longer than others. Still, without mediation and diplomacy, resolutions among states rarely come to fruition.

*Opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Anadolu.

• Ankara
• Ethiopia
• Russsia
• Somalia
• Turkiye
• Ukraine
• US